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Mayer v. Mayer: Estoppel and Foreign Divorce
A suitor persuades a married woman to obtain an invalid divorce from her
husband and actively helps her procure that decree so that they may marry.
When their marriage turns sour and the wife sues for divorce and alimony, can
the husband defend on the ground that they are not married because her former
divorce was invalid? In Mayer v. Mayer,1 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
held that "a husband, who actively participates in his wife's procurement of an
invalid divorce from her prior husband, is estopped from denying the validity of
that divorce."' 2 The court's decision was particularly significant because in es-
topping the husband from attacking the validity of his wife's divorce, the court
gave practical effect to a "quickie" foreign divorce, which the court considered
invalid on both jurisdictional and public policy grounds.3
The Mayer decision is important for two reasons. First, the court addressed
"[flor the benefit of the bar ' 4 a question of first impression in North Carolina-
whether recognition should be given to a divorce obtained in a foreign country
in which neither party was domiciled. Second, the court applied the equitable
doctrine of estoppel6 to prevent a husband, not a party to his wife's prior di-
1. 66 N.C. App. 522, 311 S.E.2d 659, disc rev. denied, 311 N.C. 760, 321 S.E.2d 140 (1984).
2. Id. at 531, 311 S.E.2d at 666.
3. See id. at 527-30, 311 S.E.2d at 663-65. Although divorces granted in sister states often are
called foreign divorces, this Note reserves the term "foreign divorce" for divorces granted by a
foreign nation.
4. Id. at 530, 311 S.E.2d at 665. The court stressed the narrowness of its holding: "Much of
what we have said impels us to reject Doris Mayer's argument that her Dominican divorce was
valid. Our narrow holding, however, must be emphasized-considering the circumstances of this
case, Victor Mayer can neither assert the invalidity of Doris Mayer's Dominican divorce nor the
invalidity of his subsequent marriage to Doris Mayer." Id. at 536, 311 S.E.2d at 669. The finding
that the husband was estopped disposed of the case; it was not necessary to determine the validity of
the divorce.
5. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
6. The court explained that "[u]nder quasi-estoppel doctrine, one is not permitted to injure
another by taking a position inconsistent with prior conduct, regardless of whether the person had
actually relied upon that conduct." Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 532, 311 S.E.2d at 666. This doctrine is
to be distinguished from "true" or "technical" estoppel. "True estoppel results from representations
made or other conduct performed for the consumption of another who relies thereon to his damage
in ignorance of the truth." Weiss, A Flight on the Fantasy ofEstoppel in Foreign Divorce, 50 COLuM.
L. REV. 409, 414 (1950); see also Rosenberg, How Void is a Void Decree, or The Estoppel Effect of
Invalid Divorce Decrees, 8 FAM. L.Q. 207, 208 (1974) (quasi-estoppel broader than traditional estop-
pel theory because no need for reliance on factual representations by other party).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey discussed the type of estoppel under consideration in this
Note, stating that it is applied to prevent a person from "taking a position inconsistent with prior
conduct, if this would injure another, regardless of whether that person has actually relied thereon."
Kazin v. Kazin, 81 N.J. 85, 94, 405 A.2d 360, 365 (1979). Professor Clark described this doctrine of
estoppel as the "principle, that one who obtains a judgment cannot later collaterally attack it upon
jurisdictional grounds." Clark, Estoppel Against Jurisdictional Attack on Decrees of Divorce, 70
YALE L.J. 45, 45 (1960). According to Professor Clark, it has long been applied to divorce decrees,
and recently has been "broadly extended." Id. at 45 & n.7. Professor Rosenberg has defined this
type of estoppel as follows: "When someone is barred from attacking a divorce decree of questiona-
ble validity because such an attack would produce an unfair result, the concept of equitable estoppel
has been applied." Rosenberg, supra, at 207. This form of estoppel has been referred to as the
"'equitable principle of estoppel,' 'so-called estoppel,' 'quasi-estoppel,' 'somewhat similar to estop-
pel,' [and] 'res judicata.'" 1 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMmY LAW § 98, at 446 (4th ed. 1979);
see Weiss, supra, at 414. The Mayer court referred to this doctrine as "quasi-estoppel," "estoppel,"
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vorce, from attacking the validity of that decree on the ground that the granting
court lacked jurisdiction.7 Although North Carolina courts have estopped par-
ties to a divorce from attacking the decree on grounds of subject matter jurisdic-
tion, 8 they had never similarly estopped a second spouse of one of the parties to
the original divorce.9 This Note analyzes the Mayer decision and concludes that
the invocation of estoppel was justified and consistent with the policy considera-
tions supporting the doctrine.
In the summer of 1980, Doris Crumpler and Victor Mayer decided to
marry,10 but they faced the obstacle of Mrs. Crumpler's marriage to Fred Crum-
pler. Under North Carolina law1 at the time, Doris Crumpler had a choice
between absolute divorce 12 based on a variety of fault grounds 13 or absolute
divorce based on one year's separation. 14 Victor Mayer insisted on a "quickie"
divorce 15 and promised Mrs. Crumpler that he would support her in a manner
better than that to which she was accustomed.' 6 As a result, on October 17,
1980, Doris Crumpler and Fred Crumpler executed a separation agreement, ac-
cording to which she relinquished any right she might have had to alimony or
support.17
Subsequently, in February 1981, Doris Crumpler traveled to the Dominican
and "equitable estoppel." Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 523-25, 530-36, 311 S.E.2d at 661-62, 665-69.
This Note adopts the term "estoppel."
For an overview of the application of estoppel to divorce cases, see Clark, supra; Phillips, Equi-
table Preclusion ofJurisdictional Attacks on Void Divorces, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 355 (1969); Rosen-
berg, supra; Swisher, Foreign Migratory Divorces: A Reappraisal, 21 J. FAM. L. 9, 37-48 (1982-83);
Weiss, supra.
7. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 530-36, 311 S.E.2d at 665-69.
8. See, eg., McIntyre v. McIntyre, 211 N.C. 698, 191 S.E.2d 507 (1937); Watson v. Watson,
49 N.C. App. 58, 270 S.E.2d 542 (1980). Unless otherwise indicated, the term "jurisdiction" will be
used throughout this Note to refer to subject matter jurisdiction rather than to personal jurisdiction.
9. See infra notes 89-107 and accompanying text.
10. Record at 44.
11. Both the Crumplers were domiciled in North Carolina. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 528, 311
S.E.2d at 664.
12. In North Carolina there are two kinds of divorce, divorce from the bond of matrimony (a
vinculo matrimonii) or absolute divorce, and divorce from bed and board (mensa et thoro). 1 R.
LEE, supra note 6, § 33. The former completely dissolves the marriage, and the parties are free to
remarry. Id. at 168; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11(a) (1984). The latter does not end the marriage but
"merely suspends the effect of marriage as to cohabitation," I R. LEE, supra note 6, § 33, and
"effects an authorized separation of the husband and wife." Schlagel v. Schlagel, 253 N.C. 787, 790,
117 S.E.2d 790, 793 (1961).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5 (1976) (adultery, impotence, pregnancy by another at time of mar-
riage, criminal act and two years' separation, unnatural sex, incurable insanity), repealed by Act of
June 24, 1983, ch. 613, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 548; see I R. LEE, supra note 6, § 64. Under § 50-5
the application for divorce had to be made by the injured party. Id. at 310. Doris Crumpler may not
have been able to prove any of these fault grounds.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1984); see 1 R. LEE, supra note 6, § 64, at 310.
15. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 535, 311 S.E.2d at 668; Record at 44-45. The court of appeals
referred to this proposition as a "fact" and stated that the record "suggest[ed]" that it was so.
Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 535, 311 S.E.2d at 668. The district court's findings of fact stated that
"defendant was aware of the arrangements for plaintiff to obtain a divorce from Mr. Crumpler in the
Dominican Republic." Record at 96.
16. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 535, 311 S.E.2d at 668; Record at 45.
17. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 535, 311 S.E.2d at 668; Record at 96.
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Republic,18 where she obtained a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differ-
ences. 19 Although the trial court found that Mr. Crumpler "acquiesced" in the
divorce,20 he did not appear in the action either in person or through counsel.
2
'
Rather, Mr. Crumpler expressed an intention to obtain a divorce in North Caro-
lina after one year's separation; at the time of the district court judgment Mr.
Crumpler had neither obtained a divorce nor remarried.
22
Victor Mayer accompanied Doris Crumpler to the Dominican Republic
and paid for all expenses except the filing fees of the divorce. 23 After returning
to North Carolina, Doris Crumpler signed, at Mr. Mayer's request,24 an ante-
nuptial agreement limiting her right to alimony to $1,000 per month for every
month their marriage lasted.25 Following the couple's marriage on March 6,
1981, they lived together in Doris Mayer's house until July 1981, when Mr.
Mayer, without provocation, left his new wife.26 Significantly, the district court
found that during the period the Mayers lived together, they "held themselves
out as husband and wife, and neither questioned the validity of their marriage
until after the separation." '27
After the separation, Doris Mayer filed a complaint seeking divorce from
bed and board,2 8 permanent alimony, and alimony pendente lite.2 9 Defendant
Victor Mayer counterclaimed for an annulment and asserted as a defense the
invalidity of his wife's prior divorce and the resulting invalidity of his mar-
riage.30 Plaintiff contended that since defendant had participated in obtaining
the Dominican divorce and had held himself out as her husband, he was es-
topped to deny the validity of that divorce.
3 1
The district court denied plaintiff's motions for alimony pendente lite and
18. Id. Doris Crumpler remained in the Dominican Republic for five days. Id.
19. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 526, 311 S.E.2d at 663; Plaintiff Appellant's Brief at 15. In 1971
the divorce law respecting foreigners in the Dominican Republic was liberalized to attract the migra-
tory divorce trade. Note, Caribbean Divorce for Americans: Useful Alternative or Obsolescent Institu-
tion?, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 116, 116 (1976); see 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DImRcToRY,
Dominican Republic Law Digest 3-4 (1985) (law of Dominican Republic permits nonresidents to
obtain mutual consent divorce if one spouse is present and the other is represented by an attorney).
20. Record at 96.
21. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 528, 311 S.E.2d at 664; see Record at 96. The court of appeals
noted that the district court had not found as a fact that Mr. Crumpler had made either an actual or
a constructive appearance in the Dominican proceeding. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 528, 311 S.E.2d at
664.
22. Record at 96.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 32-33, 48-49.
25. Id. at 96-97 (agreement signed March 4, 1981). For example, if the marriage lasted for 12
months, Doris Mayer would be entitled to alimony of $1,000 per month for a period of 12 months.
26. Id. at 97.
27. Id.
28. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-7 (1984) (grounds for divorce from bed and board); supra note
12 (discussion of divorce from bed and board).
29. Record at 5-6 (complaint filed October 15, 1981). See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-16.2, -16.3
(1984) (grounds for alimony and alimony pendente lite).
30. Record at 8; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51.3 (1984) ("All marriages between.. . persons
either of whom has a husband or wife living at the time of such marriage. . shall be void.").
31. Record at 16.
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attorney's fees.32 Although the court determined that plaintiff would have satis-
fied the grounds for alimony and alimony pendente lite if the parties had been
married, 33 it concluded that plaintiff's Dominican divorce was invalid due to
lack of jurisdiction in the granting court, and that therefore her subsequent mar-
riage was void.34 Further, the court concluded that Victor Mayer was not es-
topped from asserting the invalidity of the divorce.35 It found estoppel
inapplicable to a foreign divorce that the state deemed invalid, inapplicable to a
person not a party to the divorce, and inapplicable to the facts of the case.
36
On appeal the court of appeals rejected Doris Mayer's contention that her
foreign divorce should be recognized in North Carolina.37 The court concluded
that comity38 should not be extended to the foreign divorce because there was
not an adequate basis for jurisdiction-either domicile or some other sufficient
relationship.39 In addition, the Dominican decree was denied recognition be-
cause it was offensive to North Carolina's public policy against the "hasty disso-
lution of marriages."''4
The court of appeals reversed the district court on the estoppel issue.4 1 Bal-
ancing conflicting public policies, the court noted that estoppel allows circum-
vention of a state's divorce law by giving practical effect to invalid divorces
obtained elsewhere.4 2 It observed, however, that it would be even more contrary
to public policy to allow Victor Mayer to avoid his marital obligations by deny-
ing the validity of the divorce.43 The court concluded that application of estop-
pel is not necessarily precluded when the party to be estopped is a second spouse
rather than one of the parties to the original divorce.44
Generally, a state has jurisdiction to grant a divorce when one of the
spouses is domiciled in that state.45 As the Supreme Court stated in Williams v.
32. Id. at 100.
33. Id. at 98; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2(4) (1984) (grounds for alimony include sup-
porting spouse's abandonment of dependent spouse).
34. Record at 98.
35. Id. at 99.
36. Id. at 99-100.
37. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 525-30, 311 S.E.2d at 662-65. The court of appeals first had to
dispose of a procedural issue. The court determined that an immediate appeal was possible despite
prior decisions holding that an order of alimony pendente lite is interlocutory and not immediately
appealable. Id. at 525, 311 S.E.2d at 662.
38. Comity is the recognition granted by one nation to legislative, executive, or judicial acts of
another nation. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). For further discussion of comity, see
infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
39. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 527-28, 311 S.E.2d at 663-64.
40. Id. at 529-30, 311 S.E.2d at 664-65.
41. Id. at 536, 311 S.E.2d at 669.
42. Id. at 532, 311 S.E.2d at 666.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 534-36, 311 S.E.2d at 667-68.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 71, at 218 (1971) provides: "A state
has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of spouses one of whom is domi-
ciled in the state." This rule is not absolute; jurisdiction sometimes is predicated on a different
requirement. See id. § 72, at 219 ("A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to dissolve the
marriage of spouses, neither of whom is domiciled in the state, if either spouse has such a relation-
ship to the state as would make it reasonable for the state to dissolve the marriage."). North Caro-
lina generally has required domicile as a minimum requirement for jurisdiction to grant a divorce.
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North Carolina (Williams //),46 "Under our system of law, judicial power to
grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on domicil." 47
Domicile is the place where one is physically present or living with the intent of
making that place his home.48 Because of the domicile requirement, the parties
to a divorce proceeding cannot confer jurisdiction on a court.49 The rationale
underlying this restriction on the parties' choice of forum is that the domiciliary
state is a third party to the marriage, and thus has an interest in the marital
relationship.50
Recognition of a divorce granted in a sister state is governed by the full
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.51 The Supreme Court
held in Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1)52 that domicile of one of the
parties to a divorce is a sufficient jurisdictional basis to entitle the divorce decree
to full faith and credit in every other state.53 The scope of this entitlement to
full faith and credit was narrowed somewhat by Williams 11, which held that the
recognizing state can deny full faith and credit to a divorce if the rendering sister
state lacked jurisdiction-that is, if neither party was domiciled in the rendering
state.54 This freedom of the recognizing state to inquire into domicile and juris-
diction was thereafter limited by Supreme Court decisions holding that if the res
judicata rules of the rendering state would bar collateral attack on the issue of
domicile and jurisdiction when both parties participated (bilateral divorce), the
full faith and credit clause bars attack on this ground in other states as well.55
Recognition of foreign divorces, however, is not governed by the full faith
and credit clause,56 but instead is dependent on the doctrine of comity.57 Com-
Wurfel, Choice of Law Rules in North Carolina, 48 N.C.L. REV. 243, 293 (1970). In addition,
jurisdiction is dependent upon residence in the state for the length of time required by statute. 3 W.
NELSON, NELSON ON DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 489 (2d ed. 1945). North Carolina has a dura-
tional residency requirement of six months. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-8 (1984); see 1 R. LEE, supra
note 6, § 98, at 452.
46. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
47. Id. at 229.
48. State v. Williams, 224 N.C. 183, 191, 29 S.E.2d 744, 749-50 (1944), aff'd, 325 U.S. 226
(1945); H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 286 (1968).
49. See, eg., Golden v. Golden, 41 N.M. 356, 370, 68 P.2d 928, 936 (1937); Weiss, supra note 6,
at 412.
50. Williams II, 325 U.S. at 230; Weiss, supra note 6, at 412. In Williams l1 the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court stated: "The marriage relation is interwoven with public policy to such an extent
that it is dissolvable only by the law of the domicil." State v. Williams, 224 N.C. 183, 192, 29 S.E.2d
744, 750 (1944), aft'd, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). See generally Sharp, Divorce and the Third Party:
Spousal Support, Private Agreements, and the State, 59 N.C.L. REv. 819 (1981) (interests of state and
parties in separation agreements).
51. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 299-304 (1942); 3
W. NELSON, supra note 45, § 33.2, at 451.
52. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
53. Id. at 298-302.
54. Williams II, 325 U.S. at 229.
55. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 350-52 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378, 384 (1948);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 73 & comment b (1971). In other words, the
res judicata rules of the state rendering the divorce are entitled to full faith and credit in all other
states.
56. 3 W. NELSON, supra note 45, § 13.11, at 439; Annot., 13 A.L.R.3D 1419, 1423-24 (1967).
57. See, eg., Warrender v. Warrender, 79 N.J. Super. 114, 119, 190 A.2d 684, 687 (App. Div.
1963), aff'd, 42 N.J. 287, 195 A.2d 16 (1964); Southern v. Southern, 43 N.C. App. 159, 161-62, 258
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ity has been described as being "neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows . . . [to decrees of another] having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens. . .. ,,58 Thus, the extension of comity to a foreign divorce is discre-
tionary.5 9 It may be denied, for example, when the foreign court lacked jurisdic-
tion or when the foreign divorce is contrary to the recognizing state's public
policy.60
The overwhelming majority of states withhold comity from a foreign di-
vorce in cases in which the foreign court lacked jurisdiction because neither
party was domiciled in the foreign nation. 61 A minority of states, however, has
extended comity to bilateral foreign divorces in which neither party was domi-
ciled in the foreign nation.62
Prior to the Mayer decision, no North Carolina cases had dealt with the
recognition of a foreign divorce, nor had any cases dealt with the recognition of
a divorce granted in a foreign nation where neither party was domiciled. 63 The
trial judge remarked at the close of the Mayer trial that this issue was "new
ground in North Carolina."" Professor Lee had reasoned in 1979 that since
North Carolina would not recognize an exparte sister-state decree granted with-
out domicile, it was unlikely that the State would recognize a similar foreign
divorce.65
Some background on the doctrine of estoppel is necessary to an understand-
ing of the Mayer decision. Estoppel may be applied to prevent attack on both
sister-state66 and foreign divorces. 67 This doctrine-that one who obtains or
S.E.2d 422, 424 (1979); 1 R. LEE, supra note 6, § 104, at 487; 3 W. NELSON, supra note 45, § 33.11,
at 440; Annot., supra note 56, at 1423-24. See generally Swisher, supra note 6, at 14-17 (comity as
applied to foreign divorces).
58. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
59. Swisher, supra note 6, at 14.
60. 1 R. LEE, supra note 6, § 104, at 487; 3 W. NELSON, supra note 45, § 33.11, at 440-42
(comity denied if divorce granted for cause not available under local law). The jurisdictional stan-
dards ofthe United States are used, rather than those of the foreign country. Annot., supra note 56,
at 1424. Comity may be denied when the grounds upon which the divorce was granted are not
available in and are contrary to the public policy of the state. E.g., Everett v. Everett, 345 So. 2d
586, 588 (La. Ct. App. 1977); cf. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 165 (1895) (Comity is extended
voluntarily and only when extension of it is not contrary to a nation's policies).
61. 1 R. LEE, supra note 6, § 104, at 488; Swisher, supra note 6, at 25-26; Note, Extension of
Comity to Foreign-Nation Divorce, 46 TENN. L. REv. 238, 242 (1978).
62. Swisher, supra note 6, at 34-37; see Perrin v. Perrin, 408 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1969) (Virgin
Islands); Yoder v. Yoder, 31 Conn. Supp. 345, 330 A.2d 825 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974); Rosenstiel v.
Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971
(1966); Hyde v. Hyde, 562 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. 1978); Weiss, supra note 6, at 426-27 (discussing
factors the New York courts consider when deciding whether to grant comity to a foreign divorce).
63. See 1 R. LEE, supra note 6, § 104, at 488. Southern v. Southern, 43 N.C. App. 159, 258
S.E.2d 422 (1979), dealt not with the extension of comity to a divorce decree but with the extension
of comity to an in personam judgment for alimony and child support. The judgment was rendered in
England, where the plaintiff was domiciled, but North Carolina's requirements for personal jurisdic-
tion were not satisfied.
64. Record at 94.
65. 1 R. LEE, supra note 6, § 104, at 488-89.
66. E.g., In re Marriage of Winegard, 278 N.W.2d 505, 509-10 (Iowa), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
951 (1979). In cases involving a bilateral sister-state divorce, attack on the divorce may be prevented
[Vol. 631194
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relies on a judgment may not later collaterally attack that judgment for lack of
jurisdiction6 8 -is an exception to the general principle that a judgment rendered
without jurisdiction is void and subject to collateral attack. 69 Estoppel, how-
ever, is not applied in every case.70 Whether estoppel will be applied depends
upon the facts of a particular case.71 Application of estoppel does not validate
an invalid divorce decree, but rather silences a collateral attack.72 The practical
effect is to give the invalid divorce decree some legal force,7 3 and to allow parties
to confer jurisdiction for a divorce by their conduct.74 The result may be to
allow an evasion of the recognizing domiciliary state's divorce laws.75
To assess the Mayer court's application of estoppel, one must first consider
the general level of acceptance accorded the doctrine, the factors that govern its
application, and its use against third-party second spouses. Although some ju-
risdictions reject estoppel,7 6 the doctrine has been accorded "broad acceptance"
by the courts.7 7 Among the factors that militate in favor of estoppel are pro-
curement of the divorce by the party to be estopped, participation of the defen-
dant in the invalid divorce, remarriage by either party, receipt of benefit such as
alimony as a result of the divorce, and knowledge of and acquiescence in the
questionable validity of the divorce.78 Professor Clark has abstracted the basic
components of a factual situation suitable for application of estoppel: "(1) the
by application of full faith and credit and res judicata. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 73 & comment (1971); see supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text. Although such a
bilateral sister-state divorce would be protected from attack under the rule of Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334
U.S. 343 (1948), courts sometimes discuss such cases in terms ofestoppel. Clark, supra note 6, at 48.
67. Annot., supra note 56, at 1452. See generally Swisher, supra note 6, at 37-45 (overview of
application of estoppel to prevent attack on foreign divorces).
68. Clark, supra note 6, at 45.
69. Id.
70. See Kazin v. Kazin, 81 N.J. 85, 94, 405 A.2d 360, 365 (1979).
71. Id.; see Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 207-08. Estoppel "is an equity principle dependent
upon events which may have occurred after the divorce was granted or apart from the divorce
action. It is not a function of the decree but a personal disability of the party attacking the decree."
Clark, supra note 6, at 47.
72. Packer v. Packer, 6 A.D.2d 464, 468, 179 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (1958); Clark, supra note 6, at
55.
73. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 207.
74. Phillips, supra note 6, at 364 & n.48.
75. Id. at 364.
76. See, eg., Everett v. Everett, 345 So. 2d 586 (La. CL App.), cert. denied, 349 So. 2d 329 (La.
1977); Weber v. Weber, 200 Neb. 659, 265 N.W.2d 436 (1978).
77. Clark, supra note 6, at 49; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 74 &
comment b (1971). Rejection of estoppel has been termed the "traditional theory," Swisher, supra
note 6, at 40, while acceptance has been described as a sociological approach, since estoppel has been
viewed as consistent with sociological theories of divorce. See Clark, supra note 6, at 56. This
sociological approach was expressed succinctly by the court in Kazin v. Kazin, 81 N.J. 85, 98, 405
A.2d 360, 367 (1979) ("There remains little, if any, interest in encouraging the resurrection of de-
ceased marriages, even if pronounced dead by other tribunals whose processes are not completely
consistent with our own.").
78. E.g., Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal. 2d 497, 505, 261 P.2d 269, 273 (1953) (remarriage), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 938 (1954); In re Marriage of Winegard, 278 N.W.2d 505, 509 (Iowa) (acquies-
cence), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 951 (1979); Norris v. Norris, 342 Mich. 83, 87, 69 N.W.2d 208, 210
(alimony), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955); Rosen v. Sitner, 274 Pa. Super. 445, 451-52, 418 A.2d
490, 493 (1980) (benefit of marrying a party to invalid divorce); Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 210-11,
220; Weiss, supra note 6, at 415-16; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 74 com-
ment b (1971).
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attack on the divorce is inconsistent with prior conduct of the attacking party;
(2) the party upholding the divorce has relied upon it, or has formed expecta-
tions based on it; (3) these relations or expectations will be upset if the divorce is
held invalid."'79 The broad scope of estoppel is illustrated by section 74 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws: "A person may be precluded from
attacking the validity of a foreign divorce decree if, under the circumstances, it
would be inequitable for him to do so."80
Courts historically have been more hesitant to apply estoppel to a third
party than to a party to an invalid divorce.81 The issue of estopping a third
party most often arises with respect to a second spouse, usually a second hus-
band, of a party to the invalid divorce.82 The second husband may be estopped
from attacking the validity of his wife's divorce if he married with knowledge of
the nature of her prior divorce, and thus received benefits from that divorce
through his marriage.8 3 He also may be estopped if he persuaded his future wife
to obtain the invalid divorce, financed or arranged the divorce,8 4 or promised
support.85
Some courts and commentators have argued the equity of estopping a sec-
ond spouse from attacking the validity of a divorce he has participated in pro-
curing.86 Since such a person, although technically not a party, stands in the
same position as the plaintiff in the divorce proceeding, the same reasons for
applying estoppel to a party to the divorce also apply to him.8 7 Further, it has
been argued that application of estoppel to the parties to an invalid divorce but
not to a second spouse "creates the impossible situation of wife or husband 'at
will,' where the divorced party who remarried cannot avoid the obligation of his
remarriage, while his second spouse could at any time seek and obtain an
annulment."8 8
79. Clark, supra note 6, at 56-57.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIrT OF LAws § 74 (1971). "Foreign" as used in the
Restatement means both sister-state and foreign country.
81. Rosen v. Sitner, 274 Pa. Super. 445, 451, 418 A.2d 490, 492-93 (1980). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 74 comment b (1971); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICr OF LAWS
§ 112 (1934) ("nor is any opinion expressed as to whether... a third person may be precluded from
questioning the validity of a divorce decree").
82. Clark, supra note 6, at 66; see, eg., Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 317 P.2d 613
(1957); Poor v. Poor, 381 Mass. 392, 409 N.E.2d 758 (1980).
83. See, eg., Zirkalos v. Zirkalos, 326 Mich. 420, 427, 40 N.W.2d 313, 316 (1949); Rosen v.
Sitner, 274 Pa. Super. 445, 451-52, 418 A.2d 490, 493 (1980).
84. See, eg., Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal. App. 2d 657, 161 P.2d 490 (1945) (financed and ar-
ranged divorce); In re Marriage of Winegard, 278 N.W.2d 505 (Iowa) (acquiescence, encouragement
and financed divorce), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 951 (1979).
85. See, eg., Kazin v. Kazin, 81 N.J. 85, 88, 98, 405 A.2d 360, 362, 367 (1979) (promise of
support, knowledge, arranged and financed divorce, receipt of benefits).
86. Goodloe v. Hawk, 113 F.2d 753, 756 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ("Equity has regard for realities
.... [Tihe appellant is as responsible for the action of the Virginia court, in a real sense, as the
appellee."); Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal. App. 2d 657, 661, 161 P.2d 490, 493 (1945) ("[the second
spouse is] as much as any other. . . responsible for. . . the suit"); Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 217;
Weiss, supra note 6, at 425.
87. Clark, supra note 6, at 66-67.
88. Note, Enforcement by Estoppel of Divorces Without Domicil: Toward a Uniform Divorce
Recognition Act, 61 HARv. L. REv. 326, 333 (1948); see Weiss, supra note 6, at 425.
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Prior to Mayer, North Carolina courts had estopped attacks on divorce
decrees for lack of jurisdiction to prevent a person from asserting that the di-
vorce to which he was a party was invalid.8 9 In McIntyre v. McIntyre90 the
North Carolina Supreme Court estopped defendant in a suit for alimony from
asserting as a defense the invalidity for lack of jurisdiction of a divorce decree he
had obtained in Nevada from his first wife.9 1 The court concluded that "reason
and justice" required this result because defendant had invoked the jurisdiction
of the Nevada court, and thereby had been able to remarry. 92 The court also
stressed that his remarriage had created new expectations on the part of his
second wife. 93 In Watson v. Watson 94 defendant in the original divorce sought
to have a Florida divorce her husband had obtained declared void for lack of
jurisdiction because he was not domiciled there. The court applied estoppel to
defendant as one alternative ground of its decision.95 Even if the divorce were
invalid, the wife would have been estopped because she had received benefits
from the divorce by entering into a settlement agreement and receiving "valua-
ble consideration."'96
The husband in Redfern v. Redfern9 7 did not attack the validity of his di-
vorce per se, but rather its validity at the date of his marriage to his second wife.
The fact setting thus differed from the typical estoppel situation.98 Although the
court in Redfern found the divorce valid at the date of the second marriage, the
opinion also contained language suggesting a decision based on estoppel. In
Redfern, defendant had instituted the divorce proceeding and had continued to
live with his second wife after discovering that the divorce judgment was not
signed until after the date of the second marriage. He failed to tell his second
wife of this flaw; therefore, the court noted he "should be equitably estopped"
from asserting this defense to his second wife's action for alihmony.9 9
Parties guilty of culpable conduct sometimes have not been allowed to in-
yoke the doctrine of estoppel. Estoppel was denied in Donnell v. Howell,1' ° a
case upholding an Alabama divorce, in which the wife stipulated that she had
obtained the divorce by fraud as to domicile. The court did not discuss the case
in terms of "clean hands"-the principle that one seeking the protection of eq-
89. See McIntyre v. McIntyre, 211 N.C. 698, 191 S.E. 507 (1937); Redfern v. Redfern, 49 N.C.
App. 94, 270 S.E.2d 606 (1980) (estoppel not explicitly relied on); Watson v. Watson, 49 N.C. App.
58, 270 S.E.2d 542 (1980) (alternate ground).
90. 211 N.C. 698, 191 S.E. 507 (1937).
91. Id. at 699, 191 S.E. at 507.
92. Id. at 699, 191 S.E. at 508.
93. Id.
94. 49 N.C. App. 58, 61, 270 S.E.2d 542, 544 (1980).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 64, 270 S.E.2d at 546; see 1 I LE supra note 6, § 98, at 463 ("A person cannot
attack a divorce decree after using the benefits which it confers.").
97. 49 N.C. App. 94, 270 S.E.2d 606 (1980).
98. See Note, supra note 88, at 327 (divorce usually attacked for lack of "jurisdiction over the
subject matter or domicil").
99. Redfern, 49 N.C. App. at 95-97, 270 S.E.2d at 608-09.
100. 257 N.C. 175, 125 S.E.2d 448 (1962).
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uity must have a clear conscience' 0 1-but stated that estopping the husband
(who also had made the fraudulent allegations) would, due to the joint stipula-
tion of fraud, be an "offense against public morals." 10 2
Thus, prior to Mayer North Carolina courts had estopped either the plain-
tiff or the defendant in the original divorce proceeding based on the following
factors: procurement of the divorce (invocation ofjurisdiction), remarriage, new
expectations upset by invalidating the divorce, receipt of benefit, and knowledge
of and acquiescence in the invalid divorce.
Two cases in which a third party was not estopped involved culpable con-
duct by the party seeking estoppel or lack of participation in the divorce by the
third party. In Cunningham v. Brigman10 3 a wife asserted estoppel against the
children of her second husband. She alleged that after her remarriage her sec-
ond husband had learned that her divorce was of questionable validity, but
nonetheless continued to live with her. The court stated that estoppel is for the
protection of innocent persons. Because the wife had procured her divorce
based on a false affidavit, she could not invoke the doctrine of estoppel.' 0 4 In an
earlier case, Pridgen v. Pridgen,105 the court had allowed a second husband to
annul his marriage on the ground that his wife had been divorced by her first
husband in an invalid proceeding. The court did not discuss the possibility of
estopping the second husband based on benefit to him from marriage, his wife's
remarriage, or the expectations that would be upset by invalidating the di-
vorce.10 6 On the facts in these cases-when the conduct of the wife claiming
estoppel was not innocent or when the second husband had not been involved in
the prior decree-North Carolina courts had declined to estop the third-party
second spouse.10 7
The Mayer court was eager to reach questions concerning the recognition of
"quickie" foreign divorces in North Carolina.10 8 Although the court could have
avoided the issue altogether, 10 9 it analyzed in some detail the jurisdictional and
public policy issues bearing on the recognition of the Dominican divorce. The
court also resolved the question of appealability so as to permit immediate ap-
peal of the validity of the Dominican divorce, further evidence of its desire to
101. For a discussion of "clean hands" as applied in estoppel cases, see Rosenberg, supra note 6,
at 221.
102. Donnell, 257 N.C. at 185, 125 S.E.2d at 455.
103. 263 N.C. 208, 139 S.E.2d 353 (1964) (will contest).
104. Id. at 211, 139 S.E.2d at 355.
105. 203 N.C. 533, 166 S.E. 591 (1932).
106. A case peripherally related to the question at hand is Carpenter v. Carpenter, 244 N.C. 286,
93 S.E.2d 617 (1956), in which the court held the decree at most voidable, not void. Id. at 295, 93
S.E.2d at 626. The court did not allow collateral attack by a second husband on the ground for
divorce alleged in his wife's prior divorce. Id. at 289, 93 S.E.2d at 622. The court carefully limited
the question before it to collateral attack on the ground for divorce alleged rather than collateral
attack on jurisdiction.
107. Cunningham concerned refusal to estop those whose claim was derived from a third-party
second spouse. See generally Clark, supra note 6, at 67 (person whose claim is derived from one who
would have been estopped is also estopped).
108. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 523-24, 311 S.E.2d at 661-62.
109. Id. at 523, 311 S.E.2d at 661; see supra note 4.
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address the foreign divorce issue. 110 The court's refusal to extend comity to a
foreign divorce granted without domicile (or other sufficient relationship be-
tween the parties and the forum), and its refusal to extend comity to a foreign
divorce contrary to the state's public policy against hasty divorce, shut off the
"quickie" foreign divorce as a viable alternative for North Carolinians.
The court in Mayer preserved the legal distinction between sister-state and
foreign divorce decrees. Briefly stated, the court's reasoning regarding the juris-
dictional prerequisites for recognition of the Dominican divorce was: since com-
ity requires domicile and there was no domicile in this case,1 11 comity will not
be extended. 112 Doris Mayer had argued that the standards by which North
Carolina extends comity to foreign divorces should mirror those by which the
state recognizes sister state divorces. 113 Those standards include the rule that
full faith and credit must be granted to bilateral divorces when the rendering
state's rules of res judicata preclude collateral attack on the issues of domicile
and jurisdiction. 114 This rule has the effect of protecting divorces granted with-
out domicile from collateral attack on jurisdictional grounds. 115 The Mayer
court maintained the distinction between recognition of sister-state and foreign
divorces, thus recognizing that this particular loophole is not available for for-
eign divorces. 11
6
The court's holding in Mayer brings North Carolina in line with the major-
ity of states that have considered the foreign divorce issue. The court observed
that the majority of American jurisdictions will not recognize a foreign divorce
if the parties were not domiciled in the granting nation. 117 Doris Mayer had
urged the court to join the "growing minority of jurisdictions" that have ex-
tended comity to bilateral foreign divorces without the domicile of either party
in the foreign nation. 118 The Tennessee Supreme Court recently joined this mi-
nority in Hyde v. Hyde.' 19 In Hyde the court upheld a divorce obtained in the
Dominican Republic by nondomiciliaries of that country, one of whom was
present in person and the other represented by an attorney. It has been noted
110. See Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 525, 311 S.E.2d at 662. The court reasoned that cases holding
that orders for alimony are interlocutory and not immediately appealable are based on a desire to
prevent delay in the execution of orders for alimony. Id.; see Fliehr v. Fliehr, 56 N.C. App. 465, 289
S.E.2d 105 (1982); Stephenson v. Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1981). Such cases,
therefore, did not bar appeal in Mayer since the appeal was from a denial of alimony. Mayer, 66
N.C. App. at 525, 311 S.E.2d at 662.
Ill. Id. at 528, 311 S.E.2d at 664; see supra note 45.
112. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 528-29, 311 S.E.2d at 664.
113. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 5-8.
114. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 73 comment d (1971).
116. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 528-29, 311 S.E.2d at 664. The court reasoned that even if Doris
Mayer's divorce had been obtained in a sister state, the Sherrer holding would not apply since her
divorce was not bilateral. Under Williams 1I the court would be free to inquire into the jurisdiction
of a sister state. Thus, North Carolina also could inquire into the jurisdiction of the Dominican
court. If Doris Mayer's divorce had been bilateral, domicile still would have been required because
the divorce was foreign. Id.
117. Id. at 529, 311 S.E.2d at 664; see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
118. Record at 9-11; see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
119. 562 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. 1978).
1985] DOMESTIC LA4W 1199
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that the Hyde court's concern with possible prejudice to the parties rather than
to the State resulting from the foreign nation's failure to require domicile for
jurisdiction is unusual.1 20 The Mayer court, on the other hand, sided with the
majority of jurisdictions.1 21 In effect, the court reasserted the validity of domi-
cile as the basis for divorce jurisdiction, a requirement that flows from the state's
interest in the marital relationship.1 22
On the question of public policy, the court concluded that the Dominican
Republic's immediate12 3 no-fault divorce was contrary to North Carolina's pol-
icy against hasty divorce. 124 The court pointed out by reference to the State's
statutes that North Carolina has a public policy against "the hasty dissolution of
marriages."'125 Until 1983 State law permitted immediate divorce, but only on
proof of fault. 126 At present the only ground for absolute divorce is separation
for one year.1 27 The court rejected an argument that the ground of irreconcila-
ble differences, upon which the Dominican divorce had been granted, was "sub-
stantially equivalent" to one year's separation.' 28 The distinction relied on by
the court was that the Dominican divorce could be obtained at once-a clear
conflict with the State's asserted public policy against hasty divorce. The Mayer
court's holding on this point differs from the Tennessee court in Hyde v.
Hyde.129 The Hyde court considered the grounds for the Dominican divorce
comparable to grounds available in Tennessee, since both were no-fault
grounds.' 30 The Tennessee court so found despite the fact that the Tennessee
no-fault statute required a cooling-off period,13 which one commentator viewed
as evidence of a state public policy against hasty divorce. 132
120. Note, supra note 61, at 247 n.59.
121. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 529, 311 S.E.2d at 664.
122. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. It is significant that the court's discussion of
jurisdiction opened with, "[The Dominican Republic had no interest in the marriage of the two
North Carolinians." Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 528, 311 S.E.2d at 664.
123. The Dominican divorce for foreigners does not have a durational residence requirement.
See 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIREcrORY, Dominican Republic Law Digest 3-4 (1985);
Swisher, supra note 6, at 10 n.4. Dominican officials have announced that foreigners can have access
to the courts within 72 hours. Note, Caribbean Divorce for Americans: Useful Alternative or Obsoles.
cent Institution?, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 116, 124 (1976).
124. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 529-30, 311 S.E.2d at 664-65.
125. Id. at 529, 311 S.E.2d at 664-65.
126. Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5 (1976) (various fault grounds), repealed by Act of June 24,
1983, ch. 613, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 42. For a discussion of no-fault and fault grounds for divorce
available in the United States, see Note, supra note 123, at 119-20.
127. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1984). The court noted that efforts to shorten the one-year
period in § 50-6 to six months had failed. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 529, 311 S.E.2d at 665. The act
repealing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5 was entitled "An Act to Abolish All Grounds for Absolute Di-
vorce Except Separation." Act of June 24, 1983, ch. 613, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 42.
128. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 529-30, 311 S.E.2d at 665.
129. 562 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. 1978).
130. Id. at 197.
131. Note, supra note 61, at 248-49; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103(c) (1984). The Tennes-
see statute requires that bills for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences be on file for 60
(no minor child) or 90 (minor child) days before being heard. Id. This requirement is distinct from
the durational residency requirement. Id. § 36-4-104.
132. Note, supra note 61, at 249. The commentator further noted that in Hyde neither party
challenged the validity of the Dominican decree, and that the court might not have upheld the
divorce had there been such a challenge. Id. at 250.
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The court of appeals in Mayer concluded that the trial court had correctly
refused to recognize the Dominican decree. 133 The court thus rejected the "so-
ciological" view, 134 urged by Doris Mayer, that every divorce decree should be
recognized since there is nothing to be gained by denying divorce when the mar-
riage has in fact ended.1 35 The court appeared to endorse the realism of the
sociological view but was not prepared to recognize a divorce granted on
grounds that did not guarantee the marriage was ended, a fact that one year's
delay would tend to confirm.
The court's refusal to recognize the Dominican decree was intended to
force North Carolinians to submit their marital difficulties to the "legislature's
judgments on the question of divorce." 13 6 The effect of this refusal will be lim-
ited because the expense 137 of a foreign divorce would have prevented many
couples from even considering one. After Mayer, what will happen to North
Carolina couples who want absolute divorce but are unwilling to wait a year?
The couples' options include committing perjury in a North Carolina court as to
the duration of their separation. 138 Another option would be for one spouse to
transfer domicile to a sister state with shorter durational residency or cooling off
period requirements. 139 Alternatively, the couple may obtain a bilateral divorce
in a sister state so as to take advantage of the rule that full faith and credit bars
attack on the issue of domicile and jurisdiction when the res judicata rules of the
rendering sister state would bar such attack. 14° The Mayer decision thus has
undermined only one method of evading North Carolina's divorce law.
The Mayer decision demonstrates that even a foreign divorce decree that
lacks jurisdiction and is substantively contrary to public policy may be given
limited practical effect through the application of estoppel. 14 1 The court deter-
133. See Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 530, 311 S.E.2d at 665. The court limited the holding to the
issue of estoppel. Id.; see supra note 4.
134. See Clark, supra note 6, at 52-53; supra note 77.
135. See Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 15-16. These arguments were summarized by the Mayer
court. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 526, 311 S.E.2d at 663. The sociological view of divorce has been
described as seeing "divorce as a regrettable but necessary legal recognition of marital failure."
Clark, supra note 6, at 54. The court noted that passage of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1984) (grounds
of one year's separation) represented a concession to or or partial acceptance of the sociological view
of divorce. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 529, 311 S.E.2d at 665.
136. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 530, 311 S.E.2d at 665.
137. When travel and lodging are taken into account, it has been estimated that the cost of a
Caribbean divorce generally exceeds that of an American divorce. Note, supra note 123, at 126.
138. Perjury has been said to be widespread in American divorce proceedings. M. WHEELER,
No-FAULT DIVORCE 5 (1974).
139. Domicile of one of the parties to a divorce is a sufficient jurisdictional basis to entitle the
divorce decree to full faith and credit in every other state. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,
298-302 (1942).
A durational residency requirement for divorce is a statutory requirement that a party to the
divorce have been a resident of the state for a certain length of time prior to the filing of the action
for divorce. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-8 (1984) requires residence of six months. Such a residence
requirement is a jurisdictional requirement, see Eudy v. Eudy, 24 N.C. App. 516, 211 S.E.2d 536,
aftd, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975), but is distinct from the domicile requirement. Swisher,
supra note 6, at 22-23; see supra note 45.
140. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
141. For the practical effect that estoppel gives to an invalid divorce decree, see supra notes 73-
75 and accompanying text.
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mined that allowing an evasion of the State's divorce law was preferable to al-
lowing Victor Mayer to deny the validity of his wife's prior divorce, which he
had actively participated in procuring. 142
The Mayer decision opens the door to further applications of estoppel to
prevent a second husband from attacking his wife's prior divorce on grounds of
jurisdiction. Two arguments adduced by the court 143 offer strong support for
the application of estoppel to third-party second spouses like Victor Mayer.
First, one who procures a divorce, though not technically a party to the action,
has invoked the jurisdiction of the court to the same extent as the plaintiff and is
equally responsible for the decision. 144 To apply estoppel to a divorce plaintiff
but not to the second spouse who actively induced the invalid divorce would be
to value form over substance. Second, failure to estop a third-party second
spouse would allow him to induce reliance on the second marriage and escape at
will any obligation of support. 145 Escape from a failed marriage is, of course,
sanctioned by the state in the form of divorce, but escape from support obliga-
tions is not permitted.
The Mayer court assembled a list of factors favoring application of estoppel
that will help guide lower courts in future cases involving possible estoppel of a
third-party second spouse. The factors present in Mayer were (1) persuasion to
obtain the divorce, (2) promise of support, (3) reliance on this promise (by sign-
ing away alimony rights from first husband), (4) escort to the site of the divorce,
(5) financing the divorce, (6) reliance on the divorce by marriage and remar-
riage, (7) receipt of benefits (by marriage, living in his wife's house, borrowing
money), and (8) acceptance of the marriage as valid until after separation. 146
Additional factors-such as the presence of a child from the second marriage or
a marriage that had been long in duration-would have strengthened the case
for estoppel. The case for estoppel may be further strengthened when the party
seeking estoppel has not taken the risk of a new marriage while aware of the
possible consequences. 147
North Carolina's public policy, as enunciated in Mayer, against hasty di-
vorce is buttressed by the Mayer court's determination that domicile be the juris-
dictional basis for foreign divorce. The court thus sought to prevent interference
by foreign nations in the marital status of the state's domiciliaries. The Mayer
case illustrates, however, that the state's control over the marriage of its domicil-
iaries, and its substantive public policy, sometimes may be overridden. The
142. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 531, 311 S.E.2d at 666.
143. The court also noted that estoppel previously had been applied by North Carolina courts.
It downplayed the factual distinctions between Mayer and the prior cases, since estoppel depends on
the facts of each case, rather than on general rules. Id. at 533-34, 311 S.E.2d at 667. The court also
noted the broad language of REsrATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONFLiCr OF LAWS § 74 (1971) and the
expansion from earlier versions. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 532 & n.4, 311 S.E.2d at 666 & n.4.
144. Id. at 534, 536, 311 S.E.2d at 666, 667-68; supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
145. See Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 532, 534, 311 S.E.2d at 666, 667-68.
146. Id. at 535, 311 S.E.2d at 668.
147. Id. at 531-32, 311 S.E.2d at 666. The district court stated in its order that "plaintiff knew
or should have known that the Dominican Republic divorce might not be recognized in North Caro-
lina." Record at 100.
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court's will to effectuate state divorce policy was properly tempered in Mayer by
considerations of equity. The court's use of estoppel against a third-party sec-
ond spouse expands the use of estoppel in North Carolina in a fashion consistent
with the basic doctrine.
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